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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND LAND-GRANT
UNIVERSITIES IN THE MILLENNIUM: WHEN WILL WE
FULFILL THE ORIGINAL PROMISE?
Christine L. Jones*
INTRODUCTION

On the occasion of the Bicentennial of the Constitution, Associate Supreme
Court Justice Thurgood Marshall observed that the Constitution's framers - even
those with anti-slavery convictions - made compromises that enshrined and protected slavery and the slave trade,' all without ever mentioning the words "slave"
or "slavery" in the final document. 2 Speaking before the San Francisco Patent
and Trademark Law Association, Justice Marshall expressed his view that patriotic zeal over the Constitution's 200th anniversary should not obscure the truth
that our Constitution is an evolving document with imperfect origins. 3 Justice
Marshall stated:
[I] do not believe that the meaning of the Constitution was forever "fixed"
at the Philadelphia Convention. Nor do I find the wisdom, foresight, and
sense of justice exhibited by the framers particularly profound. To the con* Associate Professor of Law and Director of Legal Writing, University of the District of Columbia, David A. Clarke School of Law. This essay grew out of my participation in the Symposium
entitled The Status of Land-Grant Universities in the Millennium: Access, Accountability, and Activism, held at the David A. Clarke School of Law on April 5, 2005. I wish to thank the members of the
Black Law Students Association who worked tirelessly to make the Symposium a success and our law
school Deans for providing research support. I also thank UDC Law Professors Alice Thomas and
Stephanie Brown for their inspiration in making this examination of Land-Grant Universities happen
and for encouraging me to participate in this examination. Finally, I thank my daughter, Faith Baxter,
a graduate student at UCLA's Bunche Center for African American Studies, for sharing her insights
and providing me with valuable research assistance.
1 Thurgood Marshall, Commentary: Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987) (discussing the compromises between Northern economic and
Southern slave interests embodied within the Constitution).
2 Id. at 2.
3 See id.
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trary, the government they devised was defective from the start, requiring
several amendments, a civil war, and momentous social transformation to
attain the system of constitutional government, and its respect for the individual freedoms and human rights that we hold as fundamental today.4
Justice Marshall pointedly observed that our contemporary view of "The Constitution" is immeasurably different from the blueprint the framers created.5 He
noted, for example, that the Founding Fathers expressly excluded "Negro slaves"
and women from the language "We the People" in the Constitution's preamble.6
These provisions of the original Constitution counted each slave as only threefifths of a person for representational purposes 7 and failed to grant voting rights
to both "Negro slaves" and women. 8 Justice Marshall also reminded his audience
of the infamous Dred Scott case, in which the Supreme Court placed its imprimatur upon the "inferiority" of those of African descent by declaring them to be
"articles of property," having "no rights which the white man was bound to
respect."1°
Concluding his remarks, Justice Marshall spoke to the "miracle" of the Constitution, which was not its birth, but its life - a life Justice Marshall described as
having been "nurtured through two turbulent centuries of our own making, and a
life embodying much good fortune that was not."11 Because of this history, Justice Marshall postulated that some people might decide to celebrate the Constitution's Bicentennial year without "flag-waving fervor."' 12 Instead, he surmised,
those non-flag-waving individuals might "more quietly commemorate the suffering, struggle, and sacrifice that has triumphed over much of what was wrong with
the original document, and observe the anniversary with hopes not realized and
13
promises not fulfilled.'
4 Id.
5 See id.
6 Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl.
3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2).
7 See id. Indeed, the Southern/Northern compromises within the Constitution led to a provision
in the original document guaranteeing the right of the Southern states to continue to import slaves
until 1808. See Marshall, supra note 1, at 3 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl.1). The pro-slavery
provision Justice Marshall cited was subsequently repealed by the Thirteenth Amendment, which
abolished slavery. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
8 Marshall noted that women were not allowed to vote until passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, over one hundred years after the Constitution's inception. See Marshall, supra note 1, at 2. Of
course, freed slaves gained the right to vote following the Civil War, through passage of the Fifteenth
Amendment. U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § 1 (ratified in 1870).

9 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
10 Id. at 405, 407-08; cited in Marshall, supra note 1, at 4.
11 Marshall, supra note 1, at 5.
12 Id.
13 Id.
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Justice Marshall's words on that constitutional bicentennial occasion have resonated through the years. 14 I turn to his remarks now, almost twenty years later,

to frame the discussion of a critical, and related, subject of "unfinished business"
in our nation: fulfilling the promise to educate the electorate through the landgrant college and university system.' 5 The grand idea of the legislation that created land-grant universities is still unfolding. 16 The idea was to provide public
higher education for the "industrial classes" in the "several pursuits and professions in life."' 7
14 A recent search on two legal research databases, Westlaw and Lexis, yielded, respectively,
151 and 119, citing references for Justice Marshall's Constitutional Bicentennial remarks. Many,
though not all, of the citing references relate Justice Marshall's remarks to the subjects of equality,
reparations for slavery, or affirmative action; they cite Justice Marshall's remarks to illustrate the
point that America's legacy of slavery has left enduring problems for which remedies must still be
wrought. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the ReparationsDebate
in America, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 318 (2003) (discussing reparations); U.W. Clemon &
Bryan K. Fair, Lawyers, Civil Disobedience and Equality in the Twenty-First Century: Lessons From
Two American Heroes, 54 ALA. L. REV. 959, 967 (2003) (discussing equality); Lundy R. Langston,
Affirmative Action, A Look at South Africa and the United States: A Question of Pigmentation or
Leveling the Playing Field? 13 AM. U. Irrr'L L. REV. 333, 366 (1997) (discussing equality and affirmative action); Donald E. Lively & Stephen Plass, Equal Protection: The Jurisprudenceof Denial and
Evasion, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1307, 1316 (1991) (discussing equality). But see Foy Meyer, III, The Rise
and Fall of Affirmative Action, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 437, 440 (2004) (discussing affirmative action,
citing both Justice Marshall and a contrary source that posits the Constitution "was not a proslavery
document.") (emphasis added).
15 For an in-depth history of the land-grant movement, see EDWARD V. EDDY JR., COLLEGES
FOR OUR LAND AND TIME: THE LAND-GRANT IDEA IN AMERICAN EDUCATION (1956). Sponsored by
Vermont Congressman Justin Morrill in 1862, Congress first passed legislation establishing land-grant
colleges. See id. at xiii. The 1862 legislation provided for a federal grant of land "to each state for the
creation of a perpetual fund to endow at least one college ... in order to promote the liberal and
practical education of the industrial professions in the several pursuits and professions in life." Gil
Kujovich, Equal Opportunity in Higher Education and the Black Public College: The Era of Separate
But Equal, 29 MINN. L. REV. 29, 41 (1987) (quoting Ch. 130 § 4, 12 Stat. 503, 504 (1862) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 304 (1980)). Unfortunately, "most of the benefits of the early land grant movement did not reach the black population in seventeen segregationist states." Id. at 42. Congress responded by passing a second land-grant Act in 1890, leaving the states with no alternative but to
provide African-Americans with some form of land-grant education. See generally EDDY at 257-66;
see also Ch. 841, 26 Stat. 417 (1890) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. 323 (1980)).
See LESTER G. ANDERSON, LAND-GRANT UNIVERSITIES AND THEIR CONTINUING CHAL3 (1976). "[T]he creation of land-grant institutions is the most significant single representation
of the democratization of higher education - a social phenomenon that has been going on not only
since the nation's founding but in reality since its beginnings in the 1600's. One of the most persistent
trends in all of American higher education has been an ever broadening concept of who should be
educated." (second emphasis added).
17 According to Eddy, the term "industrial classes" was intended as a general designation for
"'all groups of the educationally underprivileged. And this objective applied to social no less than
economic disparity."' EDDY, supra note 15, at 37 (citing Earle D. Ross, On Writing The History of
Land-Grant Colleges and Universities, THE JOURNAL OF HIGHER EDUCATION, November 1953, xxiv,
at 8).
16

LENGE
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From the beginning, however, the land-grant idea was hobbled in its imple-8
mentation. Congress permitted the schools to be lawfully segregated by race,'
thus allowing the scourge of racism to infect the infant public institutions of
higher learning, whose purported design was to equip ordinary members of society for a growing industrial economy. 19 From a tainted birth, our land-grant system consequently developed into an unhealthy adult.2 ° Sadly, litigation to

equalize educational opportunities within the formerly separate and unequal colleges of higher learning has left some believing that inadequate federal remedies
21
and other vestiges of the former system continue to injure African-American
students and to minimize their educational opportunities.22

At this juncture, we cannot willfully overlook the connection between the historically segregative underpinnings of land-grants and the current status of African-Americans in public higher education.2 3 To do so denigrates, or even erases,
the lived experience of all those injured or excluded by the dual systems of une24
qual
educational
25 continue to suffer exclusion
as well as those who
through
misguidedopportunity,
policies of "color-blindness.,

18 Although, technically, the 1890 legislation called for "nondiscriminatory admission," Congress deemed that non-discrimination requirement to be met by any school that established and maintained separate colleges for "white and colored" students, if the "funds [were] equitably divided." § 1,
26 Stat. 417, 418. The southern states were most happy to oblige in establishing separate facilities for
blacks. Unfortunately, "equitable" did not mean "equal." See EDDY, supra note 15, at 258; see also
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (subsequently endorsing a more general notion of constitutionally permissible "separate but equal" policy in the public spheres of life between blacks and
whites).
19 See Kujovich, supra note 15, at 44 (describing the legacy of separate and unequal education
in the land-grant system).
20 The history of inequality in public higher education is well known. See id. Recognizing these
shortcomings does not mean one does not acknowledge the contributions of land-grants to the life of
the nation, as well. See, e.g., EDDY, supra note 15, at 267-76.
21 For purposes of this article the terms "African American" and "black" will be used
interchangeably.
22 See Gil Kujovich, Desegregation in Higher Education: The Limits of a Judicial Remedy, 44
BUFF. L. REV. 1, 15 (1996) (discussing the inadequacy of the federal remedy ordered in the Fordice
litigation).
23 See Michael Dobbs, Universities Record Drop in Black Admissions, WASH. POST, Nov. 22,
2004, at Al.
24 See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 727 (1992) (finding constitutional violations in the
operation of dual land-grant systems of higher education in the state of Mississippi); see also Knight v.
Alabama, 787 F. Supp. 1030, 1065-147 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (finding a history of separate and unequal
land-grant colleges in Alabama), modified by Knight v. Alabama, 14 F.3d 1534 (11th Cir. 1994).
25 The Court in Fordiceidentified four policies in the State system that had a "continuing segregative effect" that was traceable to former de jure segregation and indicated that other policies might
also be infected with constitutional infirmities. 505 U.S. 717, 733-42; see also infra notes 60-66 and
accompanying text on the "color-blind theory" of race.
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To be sure, fully facing the consequences of "the unpleasant truth of the history of slavery in America" 26 has never been easy.27 Speaking to our apparent

willingness to simply ignore the more shameful aspects of our national history,
one commentator, citing Justice Marshall's Bicentennial remarks in part, put it
this way:
Just as it was difficult in the Bicentennial Year ... for many public figures to
recognize the core injustices built into the original Constitution on the issue
of slavery, it is hard for judges to recognize and deal with the consequences
of the tragic history of relations between the United States and American
Indian nations. The strategy of choice is inoculation. The "original sins" of
both slavery and conquest are recognized and deplored; yet they are relebeyond them. 28

gated to the past with the pretense that we have gotten

In this essay, I suggest that the pretense that we have transcended the sins of
our segregated past in public higher education is what keeps us from fully recognizing the full benefits of the original land-grant promise. Instead, we continue to

offer anemic solutions to the problem of under-representation of African-Americans in the halls of public higher education, particularly within the more "elite"
schools. We do this, on the one hand, pretending that the consequences of de-

cades of purposeful discrimination in higher education can disappear without aggressive affirmative action, 2 9 and, on the other hand, fearful of reverse
discrimination 3 ° lawsuits by "injured, 31 whites. In the end, as Justice Blackmun
26 See Marshall, supra note 1, at 3.
27 In the first Reconstruction period, for example, the Supreme Court interpreted the Civil War
Amendments to the Constitution so narrowly as to drain them of their substantive force and content seemingly without regard to slavery's recent end. Justice Marshall elaborated on this regrettable
Court history in his concurring opinion in the Bakke case. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 391 (1978) (plurality opinion) (Marshall, J., concurring).
28 Joseph William Singer, Well Settled?: The Increasing Weight of History in American Indian
Land Claims, 28 GA. L. REV. 481, 528-29 (1994) (citing Marshall, supra note 1, at 3).
29 One definition of affirmative action holds it is "a set of policies intended to promote race/
gender that take[ ] race/gender into account." FRED L. PINCUS, REVERSE DISCRIMINATION: DISMANTLING THE MYTH 21 (2003).
30 Pincus states that "'reverse discrimination' is a widely used concept with no universal definition." See id. at 3. In his study of alleged victims of affirmative action, the complainant of "reverse
discrimination" was generally a white male who failed to receive something (a job, promotion, contract, college admission) that he believes he might have gotten if there were no affirmative action
policy in place. Id. Pincus concluded that "reverse discrimination is a socially constructed concept that
is used by conservatives and some liberal critics to attack affirmative action," despite evidence that
demonstrates, unequivocally, that "whites as a group are still substantially better off than people of
color." Id. at 139-40. See also MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A
COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY 52 (2003) [hereinafter WHITEWASHING RACE]. ("[T]here is little evidence
that white men lose jobs due to affirmative action."). Id.
31 "As individuals and as a group, [whites] derive advantages from the ways in which race limits
the lives of people of color, whether they know it or not." WHITEWASHING RACE, supra note 30, at 51;

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

recognized in his discussion of affirmative action in the Bakke 32 case, "to get
33
beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way."
Heeding the call from Justices Marshall and Blackmun, this essay on the status of
affirmative action in the land-grant system asks that we honestly "take account of
race," in order to truly transcend it. 34 This is a modest suggestion, and our history
demands that we do no less.35

I. How

RACE MATFERS

The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line - the
relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in
America and the islands of the sea.36

Even now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, W.E.B. DuBois's oftquoted pronouncement on the significance of "the color line," or race, is still
relevant. 37 According to Professor Kevin Brown, all but the "most obstinate observer of race relations acknowledges significant improvement in the social, political, economic, and educational conditions of African-Americans "38 since 1954's
see also PINCUS, supra note 29, at 68 ("[Tlhe innocence argument ignores the concept of cumulative
advantages [of whites as] the beneficiaries of past discrimination.").
32 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding that the medical school
at the University of California could constitutionally take race into account in its admissions decisions, but that the school could not establish set quotas for minority students, without running afoul of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection guarantee).
33 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407 (plurality opinion) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun said,
in addition, "We cannot - we dare not - let the Equal Protection Clause perpetuate racial
supremacy." See id. Justice Blackmun's definition of "racism" may not be entirely discernible from his
concurring opinion in the Bakke case. However, Professor Howard Winant provides a working definition of "racism" sufficient for the purposes of this essay: "[Racism is] one or more of the following: (1)
signifying practice that essentializes or naturalizes human identities based on racial categories or concepts; (2) social action that produces unjust allocation of socially valued resources, based on such
significations; (3) social structure that reproduces such allocations." HOWARD WINANT, THE NEW
POLITICS OF RACE: GLOBALISM, DIFFERENCE, JUSTICE 220 n.6 (2004).
34 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407 (plurality opinion) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
35 Moreover, a call to "see" race in order to get beyond racism should not be misunderstood as
an attack upon white Americans. See, e.g., Wendy Brown Scott, Transformative Desegregation:Liberating Hearts and Minds, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 315, 342 (1999) [hereinafter Transformative Desegregation]. ("The struggle of African-Americans for racial justice is not against individual white
Americans, but against the ideologies of racism and white supremacy that have blinded our nation to
the humanity and worth of racial minorities.") Id.
36 W.E.B. DuBois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 13 (Penguin Books 1989) (1903).
37 "Today, as a new century begins, race is still a pervasive and troubling fault line running
through American life." WHITEWASHING RACE, supra note 30, at 1 (quoting W.E.B. DuBois on the
"color-line," supra note 36).

38

KEVIN BROWN,

RACE, LAW AND EDUCATION IN THE POsT-DESEGREGATION

PERSPECTIVES ON DESEGREGATION AND RESEGREGATION
EDUCATION].

5 (2005)

ERA: FOUR

[hereinafter RACE, LAW AND
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landmark Brown v. Board of Education39 decision. Indeed, some would say that

race matters less now than at any other time in this country's history. 40 And yet,
according to Professor Brown, African-Americans "still lag far behind non-Hispanic whites in terms of political, economic, educational and social welfare and
health conditions.",4' To support this conclusion, Brown cites some sobering
statistics:
When adjusted for inflation, the per capita income of African Americans
...increased by 250% from 1967 to 2000. Yet, this increase left blacks

earning only 65% of that of non-Hispanic white per capita income in
2000 .... The percentage of blacks ages 18 to 24 enrolled in higher education increased from 13% in 1967 to 31.3% in 2001. However, the percentage

of non-Hispanic whites enrolled in college increased over the same period
from 26.9% to 39.3%.42 [I]n 2002, blacks constituted 47.8% of the 1,848,700

persons in either state or federal prison or local jails [although AfricanAmericans comprise only 12.3% of the population].4 3

The above social measures, and many other similar statistics, suggest that even
in the millennial "post-desegregation" an world, race still matters. Indeed, if one
accepts that a system of ideas regulating race and ethnicity in the "service of both
39 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (also referred to as "Brown I") (declaring "separate educational facilities
in public schools for black and white children unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause, reversing the decades-old "separate but equal" holding of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)). Brown was the first step in the dismantling of American slavery's legacy of
educational inequality. It was an anti-discrimination victory, which ushered in a new national policy of
desegregation, starting with the lower public schools. The decision was quickly applied to public colleges and universities. See Bd. of Trustees v. Frasier, 350 U.S. 979 (1956) (per curiam), summarily affd
134 F. Supp. 589 (M.D.N.C. 1995); Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control, 350 U.S. 413, 414 (1956)
(per curiam) (indicating there was "no reason for delay" in the elimination of racial barriers at white
public colleges.). But see United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 729 (1992) (recognizing that Brown's
teaching applies to public colleges and universities, but applying a different analysis on the ground
that attendance is voluntary, not compelled, as in the lower grades).
40

See, e.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS AND

CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUrIONS 144 (2d ed. 1980) (concluding that, in the modern industrial
period, the problems of subordination for certain segments of the black population and experiences of
social advancement for others are more directly associated with economic class than with racial oppression, making it "increasingly difficult to speak of a single or uniform black experience").
41 RACE, LAW AND EDUCATION, supra note 38, at 3; see also Courtland Milloy, Apologies Futile
When Wrongs Are Not Righted, WASH. POST,June 26, 2005, at B1 ("While some African Americans
are now among the wealthiest people in this country ....millions more are the absolute poorest.").
42 RACE, LAW AND EDUCATION, supra note 38, at 3-5 (citing U.S. Census data).
43 Id.
44 See id. at 33. Professor Brown defines "post-desegregation awareness" as the conscious
awareness that racial phenomena, like the Supreme Court's opinion in Brown and the school desegregation it generated are not understood as separate, isolated and unconnected incidents." Instead, "we
comprehend it against a sub silentio background of a much larger set of ideas regarding race and
ethnicity which structure and limit our perception of a given racial phenomena." Id.
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domination and resistance, 45 has existed for at least five centuries (roughly coinciding with the rise of Europe and the dawn of the capitalist era), then one must
also accept that "the racial practices of the modern age - slavery and imperial
anticolonialism - shaped all the social strucconquest, as well as abolitionism and
46
tures we take for granted today."
In other words, race has always been a socially constructed concept. While
"the concept of race appeals to biologically based human characteristics (socalled phenotypes), selection of these particular human features for purposes of
47
racial signification is always and necessarily a social and historical process.,
48
one that is
Perhaps most importantly, then, "race is a sociohistoricalconstruct,,
"constantly being remade by human beings over historical time."'4 9

H.

SEEING RACE

Today, more than ever, what we make of race depends upon the lens through
which we gaze. Depending upon one's perspective, America's progress toward
full equality has been fully satisfied, is in stagnation, or is somewhere else along
the equality continuum. 50 It would be fair to say that "for the first time in modern
history, there is widespread, indeed worldwide, support for what had until recently been a 'dream,' Dr. King's dream ... of racial equality." 51 But it would be
equally fair to say that "white supremacy is hardly dead. It has proven itself capable of absorbing and adapting much of52the 'dream,' repackaging itself as 'colorblind,' nonracialist, and meritocratic.",
Professor Brown refers to the "diverse set of ideas used to view given racial
phenomena" as "discourses." 5 3 He has identified four such discourses to generally characterize the ways in which Americans think about racial issues. The four
discourses are "Traditional Americanism," "Colorblind Individualism," "American Collectivism," and "African-American Centralism." 54 Brown acknowledges
that "there is nothing intrinsic or inevitable about [these] four systems of meansupra note 33, at ix.

45

WINANT,

46
47
48
49
50
51

Id.
Id. at x.
Id. at xviii.
Id.
See generally, RACE, LAW AND
WINANT, supra note 33, at xiii.

52

See id.; see also Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as PoliticalActs: Guardiansat the Gates of

EDUCATION,

supra note 38, at 35-156.

Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 132 (2003) ("Deciding who 'deserves' to benefit from
admission to selective colleges and universities now occurs within a 'testocracy' that claims to sort,
evaluate, and rank measurable mental aptitude.").
53 RACE, LAW AND EDUCATION, supra note 38, at 33. Professor Brown also describes these
differing views as "patterns of understanding," "systems of meaning," or "cognitive frameworks." See
id.
54 See id. at 33.
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ing . . . .
Their usefulness seems to lie mostly in providing a structure and a
vocabulary to describe the varying lenses through which we view these race issues. 5 6 Indeed, Brown acknowledges that each cognitive framework carries its
"own epistemology and provides its own mode of rationality, but that rationality
operates only within the conceptual boundaries of the given cognitive framework." 5 7 To illustrate, he states:
"5

The definition of words that deal with interpretation of racial phenomena
such as racism, racial oppression, racial discrimination and racial equality
have different meanings within each of the respective patterns of understanding. Because each pattern of understanding is structured around different conceptions of the social world, it has different embedded values,
beliefs and judgments for the same racial issue. . . .. These cognitive
frameworks will also ascribe different roles and functions to government.5 8
According to Professor Brown, the dominant discourse on race in this country
"for a long time" was Traditional Americanism, a discourse in which blacks were
deemed "presumptively inferior." 59 Professor Brown maintains that over the past
thirty years, the Supreme Court has increasingly 6° embraced Colorblind Individualism in its jurisprudence.6 1 Colorblind Individualism, according to Brown, is a
system of meaning that "did not spring into existence all at once." 62 Brown describes it as "a compilation and mix of the points of view of many different liberal
55 Id.
56 Because of the usefulness of this language and structure, I shall borrow and adopt the language of Brown's four discourses to amplify the meaning and structure of the discussion of race in this
essay. In adopting this framework, however, I do not intend to operate in a reductive manner. The
descriptions of the four discourses contained in this essay do not purport to elucidate the many facets
of the systems of meaning Professor Brown has carefully constructed.
57 RACE, LAW AND EDUCATION, supra note 38, at 33. At the same time, Brown concedes that
the human mind is flexible enough for individuals to comprehend a given racial phenomena in more
than one cognitive framework, or, in "multiple apprehensions." Id. at 34.
58 Id. at 33-34.
59 See id. at 33, 35; In fact, Brown identifies the "long" period in which Traditional Americanism dominated the nation's discourse on race as being between 1619, when the first blacks landed in
Jamestown, Virginia, until 1954, when the Brown case was decided. Between those dates, blacks were
viewed, quite simply, as "substandard beings." See id. at 35. This belief, he says, "made the oppression
of blacks in the form of slavery, and later segregation, seem as if [they were] rational responses to the
natural order." Id.; see also supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
60 Brown cautions that the Supreme Court has not formally adopted a colorblind approach to
the equal protection clause, but some aspects of the Court's approach - requiring proof of discriminatory motivation before finding a constitutional violation and limiting governmental use of racial classifications only to those applications that survive strict scrutiny - are suggestive of underlying
theoretical assumptions consistent with the Colorblind Individualism discourse. RACE, LAW AND EDUCATION, supra note 38, at 128.
61 Id. at 33, 103-28.
62 Id. at 33, 103.
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have extolled the virtues and benefits of individpoliticians and philosophers who
' 63
uality and self-determination. "
One example of Colorblind Individualism that Brown notes is through use of
Martin Luther King Jr.'s statement in his "I Have a Dream Speech," which provides that people should not be "judged by the color of their skin, but the content
of their character." 64 An important feature of Colorblind Individualism is its conception of society as a collection of "Knowing Individuals." In Brown's description, Knowing Individuals are "products of self-determination, not
acculturation." 65 Above
all, they are "free-willed, rational, autonomous" and
66

"self-determined."

The discourse of American Collectivism is utilitarian in nature. Its "motivating
idea .

.

. is advancing the best interest of the American people.",67 Moreover,

Brown reports, "[t]his utilitarian pattern of understanding views all Americans as
united into one people.... 68 As Justice Scalia put it: "we are all just one race
here.... American.",69 This discourse examines race through a lens that examines

what is best for the interests of the country based on shared "American" values.7 °
Historically, some of the shared "American" values permitted maltreatment of
blacks, including treating blacks as non-citizens. 7 1 However, under this discourse,
an American may be called upon to suffer for the collective good. "Since the

focus of this cognitive framework is on the collective good, it72 discounts the
problems and suffering of any particular racial or ethnic group.,
The final discourse is "African-American Centralism." Professor Brown describes this cognitive framework as a "counter discourse" because it developed in
63 Id. at 103; see also id. at 104-28. Brown cites, in particular, John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin.,
Frank Michelman and Bruce Ackerman. Id. at 331 n.100.
64 Id. at 22 (citing Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream (Aug. 28, 1963), in A TESTAMENT
OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 217,219 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1986)).
65 Id. at 105.
66 RACE, LAW AND EDUCATION, supra note 38, at 105. Elsewhere, Brown cites several cases
that the Supreme Court has decided which he characterizes as having been influenced by the Colorblind Individualism pattern of understanding. One of the cases included is Keys v. School DistrictNo.
1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), cited, in part, because Keys was a threshold equal protection decision establishing an intent, versus an effects, standard of proof to show unconstitutional discrimination arising out
"facially neutral" governmental conduct. See RACE, LAW AND EDUCATION supra note 38, at 23, 20810. Under the Colorblind Individualism model, adverse impacts upon African-Americans that are not
intentional ("Knowing"), will be viewed as an "unfortunate by-product" of racially neutral action. Id.
at 210.
67 Id. at 129.
68 Id.
69 See id. at 130 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
70 See id. at 129, 131.
71 Id. at 131-32.
72 Id. at 133.
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opposition to the discourse of Traditional Americanism.73 Brown depicts the dis-

course as deriving from blacks' recognition of their own oppression and their
rejection of the label of inferiority directed at them through the discourse of
74
Traditional Americanism:

Against the backdrop of 335 years of racial domination that preceded the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the descendants

of the sons and daughters of the soil of Africa in the United States and
those non-blacks sympathetic to their cause formulated a counter discourse
to that based on the belief of blacks as the paradigmatic inferior group in

the United States. The development of African-American Centralism was
limited by and responsive to the racial oppression imposed on the black
community ....
African American Centralism was driven by the desire to

eradicate the racial oppression of blacks. As a result, this pattern of understanding is structured around a view of the social world that conceptualizes
African-Americans as oppressed, not inferior.75

Thus, the overriding goal of those operating under the African-American Centralism cognitive framework is to liberate blacks from racial domination.7 6 Under
this "counter discourse," "racial equality" will be found only "when blacks exer-

cise proportionate social and economic power on par with non-Hispanic
whites. ,77
Justice Marshall's Constitutional Bicentennial commentary had the hallmarks
of the "counter" discourse of African-American Centralism, as his words spoke
to the oppression of African-American people.78 Justice Marshall also embodied
the counter discourse of African American Centralism as he reminded his audi73 RACE, LAW AND EDUCATION, supra note 38, at 73.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 75.
77 See id. at 77. Professor Brown contends that success for individual blacks is not the goal - it
is merely a "necessary aspect of group based racial equality." Id. (emphasis added). In other words,
the interests of the oppressed group are paramount, since "every black individual is viewed as always
linked to the struggle against racial oppression." Id.; cf WINANT, supra note 33 (defining racism). See
also WINANT, supra note 33, at 36 ("[R]acial identity" is an "aspect of individual and collective
selfhood.").
78 See supra notes 6-13, 73-77 and accompanying text; see also Marshall, supra note 1, at 5
("'We the People' no longer enslave, but the credit does not belong to the framers. It belongs to those
who refused to acquiesce in outdated notions of 'liberty,' 'justice,' and 'equality,' and who strived to
better them."). Indeed, Justice Marshall's jurisprudence on race, generally, seemed to fall within the
African American Centralism pattern of understanding. His concurring opinion in the Bakke case is
reflective of that discourse, for example, as he called attention to the history of oppression against
blacks in this country to sustain a conclusion that the Davis Medical School's affirmative action policy
did not violate the Equal Protection clause. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
400 (1978) (plurality opinion) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[A] whole people were marked as inferior
by the law.").
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ence that this country now rejects the label of inferiority that the framers of the
Constitution - steeped in a Traditional Americanism cognitive framework - had
placed upon African-Americans with the three-fifths rule. 79 Justice Marshall also

employed that counter discourse when he explicitly challenged Chief Justice Taney's disgraceful labeling of "Negro slaves" as "inferior" and unworthy of constitutional protection in the Dred Scott8° case. In keeping with his view that the
Constitution is still evolving, Justice Marshall ended his remarks
by simply refer81
ring to its "hopes not realized and promises not fulfilled.
III.

AFRICAN AMERICAN CENTRALISM, "MISSION,"

AND THE

LAND-GRANT UNIVERSITY

We have now established an historical basis and framework for considering
race more fully in a critical examination of affirmative action in the land-grant
university setting. Just as Justice Marshall spoke of constitutional "promises not
83
fulfilled,",8 2 on a less grand scale, we also may speak of "promises not fulfilled
as we discuss land-grant universities. Moreover, I believe that it would be most
useful to have the discussion proceed using the discourse of African American
Centralism. 84 Within this framework, the singular goal of freedom from centuries
of oppression against African-Americans is explicit, not hidden, or even sugarcoated.85
The U.S. Supreme Court has now sanctioned the constitutional use of race as
one among other competing factors in the admission process of public universities 86 - which includes our land-grant institutions. The Court has done so, however, with a wink and a nod to affirmative action opponents 87 by suggesting that
affirmative action should not be necessary by the year 2028.88 In my view, this
"sunset" provision is an indication that our nation is still not prepared to invest
79 See Marshall, supra note 1, at 2.
80 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
81 See supra note 1, at 5 and accompanying text.
82 Marshall, supra note 1, at 5.
83 Id.
84 See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
85 Cf.RACE, EDUCATION AND LAW, supra note 38, at 75.
86 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the affirmative action plan adopted
by the University of Michigan Law School); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (rejecting
the affirmative action plan of Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and Arts because it did not
provide for individualized consideration of applicants). The Grutter majority found that "[e]ffective
participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if
the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized." 539 U.S. at 332.
87 Cf David Glenn, Can We Improve Race Relations By Giving Racists Some of What They
Want?, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, July 19, 2002, at A12-A14.
88 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
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the necessary energy into disestablishing the remaining institutional vestiges 8 9 of
90

our former slave system.
I say this because, since slavery formally ended, there have been many new

obstacles placed in the way of African-Americans: first in the form of an aborted
Reconstruction period, 91 then in the form of state-sanctioned segregation with
the attendant horrors of Jim Crow. After Brown9 2 was decided, the country en-

joyed an all-too-brief Second Reconstruction period in which the civil rights of
African-Americans were finally recognized. 93 That Second Reconstruction period began to formally end almost as soon as it began, as challenges to affirmative

action programs
in higher education and public contracting gained impetus in the
94

early 1970's.
By the late 1980's, and early 1990's, Congress found it had to pass civil rights
restoration legislation to undo the negative effects of narrow Supreme Court interpretations that were decidedly hostile to the interests of African Americans.95

96
In short, African-Americans have been engaged in an ongoing, un-imaginary
struggle to achieve equality of opportunity and treatment in this nation. As I see
it, when there is a "sunset" on racism against African-Americans, then the time
for affirmative action on behalf of African-Americans may officially end.9 7
My modest suggestions for what to do in the meantime are two-fold. Thank-

fully, they will be shared by others who might also embrace a cognitive frame-

work of African-American Centralism. First, we must continue to teach about
89 Professor Scott Brown contends in Transformative Desegregation,for example, that "ideologies of racial and cultural equality" need to be infused into the traditional liberal arts campus and
classroom as a part of a constitutional remedy countering the vestiges of white supremacy. Transformative Desegregation,supra note 35, at 376.
90 See id. at 381-82.
91 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
92 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
93 See, e.g., the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000); the Voting Rights Act of
1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000); and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000). All of these
enactments were preceded by massive resistance and struggle on the part of African-Americans and
sympathizers.
94 See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (challenging a race-conscious affirmative
action plan of the University of Washington Law school, but not decided on the merits); United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (unsuccessfully challenging a voluntary raceconscious affirmative action plan derived through collective bargaining).
95 See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1991).
96 See, e.g., PINCUS, supra note 29, at 7-8 (citing data showing 80% of whites deny the importance of discrimination against blacks).
97 See generally, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Closing the Gap: Moving
From Rhetoric to Reality In Opening Doors To Higher Education For African American Students
(New York, June 23, 2005). This report asserts the need for race-conscious affirmative action in higher
education persists and that the remedies approved of in Grutter must be preserved.
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98
race and racism in the 21st century, and we must be creative in that endeavor.
We simply must increase the "racial literacy" 99 quotient of this nation. To that
dispelling the myths of "white
end, part of our teaching must be directed toward
' 101
innocence" 1 00 and "reverse discrimination."
Second, we must abolish all admission practices and policies in public higher
education -particularly within land-grant institutions - that have segregative effects. We must also make concerted efforts to "anchor [our] admission decisions
in a commitment to future public service." 10 2 Our mission objectives for our

schools must be broad, openly aspirational, 10 3 inclusive, and non-retrogressive.
Indeed, we must discard all academic policies that would lead to retrenchment.10 4

In the march forward out of the dismal - but not historically distant - past, we
must be vigilant to guard our victories as we continue to stake out territory in a
truly democratic future. On this point, I believe Justice Marshall would agree.

98 See WINANT, supra note 33, at xi (Our institutions of higher learning are "failing to come to
grips" with the "continuing dynamics of racial formation.").
99 "A racially literate institution uses race as a diagnostic device, an analytic tool, and an instrument of process. Guinier, supra note 52, at 201.
100 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
101 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
102 Guinier, supra note 52, at 158.
103 See Transformative Desegregation, supra note 35, at 338.
104
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